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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Freedom of Movement-A Modern Challenge
During the summer of 1957, over three-quarters of a million Ameri-
cans visited Europe. It is expected that some 15,000 Americans will
travel around the globe this year. Every year, in increasing droves, peo-
ple depart from the United States to explore all parts of the world. His-
torically the American population has always been transitory, having
originally migrated to this continent from Europe and later westward with
the growth and development of the nation. At the present time, due to
efficient and rapid transportational facilities, and as a result of the overall
increase in leisure time, it does not seem unnatural that Americans have
more and more turned to exploring other lands. Americans travel more
while vacationing than any other group of people. The right to move
about freely is one which is taken for granted. Unrestricted transit is
tacitly assumed to be an inalienable right of a freedom loving society, and
it is not until times of strain and duress that the exact nature of such
right is examined. It is during such times that a problem of academic
interest is transformed into one of fundamental concern.
In recent years a number of persons have been denied the right to
leave this country. It is the purpose of this note to describe the manner
in which a basic right, the right of freedom of movement, has been qual-
ified and restricted as to the freedom of an individual to leave the con-
fines of the United States. A serious constitutional problem is presented
-when a governmental agency attempts to prevent a person from leaving
the country because of his political views. Such restriction might be con-
stitutionally upheld either by designating the action as justifiable sover-
eign interference with a fundamental right, or it might be declared that
freedom of movement across our national borders is no more than a privi-
lege.
By permitting such restrictions, either because an individual might
freely communicate with communists outside the U. S. or because one
might voice opinions contrary to those endorsed by the government, the
courts would show approval of the same methods employed by totalitarian
governments. Yet, if there is truly a danger involved, such restriction
must be allowed in the interest of national survival. The courts are,
therefore, faced with the problem of determining the nature and extent to
which freedom of movement may be limited without undermining the
basic principles of a democratic society.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Nowhere in the Constitution of the United States is there to be found
any mention of the right of freedom of movement. There was reference
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to a right of freedom of transit between states in the Articles of, Con-
federation' but historically the recognition of the right of movement un-
der the Constitution has been the result of judicial interpretation. The
courts have acknowledged the existence of a right of mobility as being
implicit in various clauses of the Constitution.
During the first half of the 19th century the United States Supreme
Court invoked the commerce clause several times in striking down state
statutes which impeded free passage between the states.2  In 1868, in
Crandall v. Nevada3 the court recognized, as a right of natural citizen-
ship, the freedom of individuals to pass and repass through states of the
nation without interference. The following year the Supreme Court stated
that the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, section 2, con-
ferred upon citizens the right of free ingress and egress to and from sister
states. 4 In 1873, in the Slaughter House cases, 5 the privileges and im-
munities section of the fourteenth amendment was declared to have con-
ferred upon a citizen the right to become a resident of any state in the
union.
After the turn of the century the Supreme Court more dearly defined
freedom of movement in terms of a fundamental right. For example, in
Williams v. Fears6 the Supreme Court said:
Undoubtedly the right of free locomotion, the right to remove from
one place to another according to inclination is an attribute of personal
liberty, and the right ordinarily, of free transit from or through the terri-
tory of any state is a right secured by the fourteenth amendment and by
other provisions of the Constitution.
This concept was made more explicit in United States v. Wheeler:
In all the states from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles
of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, in-
herent in the citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within
the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place
therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom .... 7
The right to leave the confines of the United States and to move else-
where in the world has also been assumed to be an inherent civil right.
'Article IV states in part that: "The better to secure and perpetrate mutual friend-
ship and intercourse among peoples of different states in the union ... the people of
each shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other state. . . "
'Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); Elkinson v. Dellesseline, 8 Fed.
Cas. 493, No. 4366 (C.C.S.C. 1823).
273 U.S. (7 Wall.) 35 (1867).
'Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
'83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
a 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); see Twining v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
" 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920). For an analysis of the right to move freely within
the United States see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IoWA L. REv. 6 (1955).
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For instance, the right of choice of nationality was recognized almost a
century ago. This was expressed in the Expatriation Act of 1868:
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of
all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness ... any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or
decision . . which denies, restricts, impairs or questions the right of ex-
patriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the
Republic!
The position of the United States regarding expatriation was reasserted
in 1930 at the Conference for the Codification of International Law.9
The right of freedom of movement has in recent years been regarded
as deserving the status of an international human right. Article 13 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948; states:
(1) Every one has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country'
It is also interesting to note that lately there has been a tendency on the
part of some free nations to insert provisions in their constitutions which
assure citizens of the right of freedom of movement."
Although passports allowing sojourn outside of the United States were
issued at an early date, possession of one was never, in times of peace, a
necessary condition precedent to departure from the country.'2 However,
866 STAT. 267 (1868), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952). For a discussion of expatriation
see 3 HAcKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 161-217 (1942); 5 HACKwORTH, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw 821-822 (1943).
'3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 161, 162 (1941); JESSUP, A MODERN
LAw OF NATIONS 75, 76, 78 (1948). Closely allied to the right of expatriation
is another right bearing upon the right of an individual to leave his sovereign terri-
tory. This is the right of emigration or the right to remove one's self and one's
property to another country. A general denial of the right of emigration would
effectively deny he right of expatriation. There are no statutes in this country spe-
cifically related to emigration.
"°UNIERSAL DEcLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948). This is not a legal
document and has no binding force. For a thorough discussion of the status of in-
ternational human rights see LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1950).
"For an index to various national constitutions which include such clauses see 3
PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 556 (1950). A typical example is to be
found in the constitution of Italy adopted in 1947. Article 16 reads, "Every citizen
may move and reside freely in any part of the national territory within the general
limits established by law for reasons of public health or security. In no case shall
a restriction be established for political reasons. Every citizen has the right to leave
the territory of the republic and to re-enter it, provided the obligations of law are
respected."




during times of war, restraints were imposed upon freedom of movement
and passports were employed as a means of regulating travel In this
manner restrictions on movement were imposed during the war of 1812,3
during the Civil War,' 4 during World War I,' and World War fl.16 It
would seem axiomatic that a nation may impose travel restrictions during
time of war, for at such times considerations of sovereign preservation
outweigh the right of citizens to move about as they wish.17
The nature of the right of freedom of movement within the United
States is well defined. In general, persons may travel freely throughout
the nation and are at liberty to choose their domicile. The states may
not unjustly interfere with the national right of citizens of the United
States to move unhindered from state to state.' 8 However, today there is
a much litigated constitutional problem concerning the right of freedom
of movement across our national borders.
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
In 1856, Congress vested in the Secretary of State complete and ex-
clusive control over the issuance of passports.19 Although this act gave
the Secretary of State full discretion, it in no way curtailed the right of
free transit. The purpose of the passport was merely to aid the Ameri-
can traveler and give him the privilege of receiving protection and other
assistance offered by American diplomats and consular offices.20
Since World War II, however, wartime restrictions pertaining to the
dispensation of passports have been continued. No one has been allowed
to enter or leave the United States without possessing a valid passport.21
In addition, the Secretary of State has exclusive authority to grant and
control the issuance of passports. 22 American citizens discovered that
- 3 STAT. 199 (1815).
"'DEPT. OF STATE, THE AmRIcAN PASSPORT 4 (1898).
'=40 STAT. 559 (1918).
=55 STAT. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C. §§ 223-226 (1946).
'Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
'Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
11 STAT. 60 (1856); thereafter amended in minor respects, and now appearing
in 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1952).
F For a discussion of passports in general see 3 HAcKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
435, 436 (1941).
a66 STAT. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (a), (b) (1952). By presidential proclamation
an emergency continues to exist thereby outhorizing invoking of this statute. PROC.
No. 3004, 67 STAT. c 31, 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1953). See 22 C.F.R. § 51.1 (Supp.
1956) and the regulation promulgated by the Secretary of State which makes it
illegal to leave and re-enter the country without a valid passport. 22 C.F.R. § 53.1
(Supp. 1956).
m44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1952).
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they could be confined to the United States at the discretion of the Sec-
retary of State and were told their trips were "not in the best interests of
the United States." The ultimate question presented by such action in-
volved the constitutional limits upon restrictions on movement during
the "cold war." During the last six years the courts have been resolving
the problem with the result that the boundaries of lawful State Depart-
ment control have been at least vaguely drawn.
In 1951, in the first case to attract attention, Paul Robeson unsuccess-
fully attempted to attack the constitutionality of the discretion exercised
by the State Department.23 A motion to dismiss was granted on the
ground that Robeson had not exhausted his administrative remedies and
no constitutional issue was presented to the court. The first case of real
significance was Bauer v. Acheson.2 4  The plaintiff, without notice or
hearing, had her passport revoked while living abroad. She attacked the
exercise of discretion of the Secretary of State as being in violation of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The court found that
freedom to travel was an inalienable right included within such amend-
ment. In arriving at this decision the court pointed to Williams v. Fears2 5
and noted that it was a basic liberty to move from place to place within
the United States. Having made that observation the court went on to say:
It is difficult to see where, in principle, freedom to travel outside the
United States is any less an attribute of personal liberty. Especially in this
time today where modern transportation has made all the world easily acces-
sible and when the executive and legislative departments of our govern-
ments have encouraged a welding together of nations...
However, the court did not strike down as unconstitutional any of the
legislative acts which presumably gave the Secretary of State his discre-
tion, but merely concluded that the plaintiff did not have a hearing con-
sistent with procedural due process. Unfortunately the plaintiff did not
press the issue of substantive due process; however, the court made it
clear that there was a constitutional right of freedom of movement to
cross our national borders. The court emphasized the point that freedom
to travel is subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of our nation-
al welfare, and that the Secretary of State does not have absolute discre-
tion. The question of what constituted reasonable regulation remained
to be answered.
Shortly after the Bauer case was decided, the Department of State
promulgated its Passport Regulations.27  These regulations purported to
' Robeson v. Acheson, 198 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
*' 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
m179 U.S. 270 (1900).
25 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952).
-22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-.170 (Supp. 1956).
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insure departmental compliance with both procedural and substantive due
process requirements. A Board of Passport Appeals was created28 and
hearings with records were provided for, although the board could con-
sider any confidential information in its possession29 when making its
decision. The regulations created three categories of subversives who
would be denied regular passports: (a) persons who are members of the
Communist Party, or who recently terminated such membership unless
evidence indicates a change of affiliation; (b) persons who engage in
communistic activities; and (c) persons, whom it is believed are going
abroad to engage in communistic activity. 0
The cases which followed the Bauer decision involved problems of
procedural due process. In Clark v. Dulles1 the court said an informal
conversation between the applicant and the Under Secretary of State was
not a fair hearing. Because of the rule that one must exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies before he may obtain relief from the courts, Clark was
sent back for a hearing. The State Department later decided, for no ap-
parent reason, to give him a passport. In the case of Nathan v. Dulles
8U
the disappointed applicant asked for a passport in December, 1952. This
request was denied without a hearing. After many delays he appealed to
the court and was told in February, 1955, that he had not had a fair hear-
ing. On March 15, 1955, the court directed, that because the Secretary
of State had still not complied with the order, the Department should
issue the plaintiff a passport. The court then ordered an immediate hear-
ing and stated that if a passport were denied, the State Department must
immediately inform the court and Nathan of the reason for the denial or
show cause for the failure to give a reason. Several days later Nathan
was issued a passport, some two and a half years after he had applied for
one. It would appear that the State Department was delaying or avoiding
the necessity of a judicial test of any substantive due process issues.
Until late in 1955 no substantive question of due process was ever
posed in respect to the right of transit out of the United States. No ques-
tion had been raised as to the legality of the creation and operation of
the Board of Passport Appeals or the constitutionality of refusing persons
022 C.F.R. §§ 51.151-.170 (Supp. 1956).
=22 C.F.R § 51.170 (Supp. 1956).
-22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (Supp. 1956). Authority for the establishment of these regu-
lations was said to be 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1952). This was
the act which vested the authority to grant passports in the Secretary of State. Also,
the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1952) was cited
to lend support to the State Department's position. This act makes it unlawful for
members of communist organizations to utilize passports.
' 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955).
m'225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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passports for political reasons. Toward the end of 1955 the District Court
for the District of Columbia decided a case touching upon substantive due
process under the fifth amendment. In Shachtman v. Dulles3 3 the peti-
tioner was denied a passport, ostensibly because he was chairman of the
Independent Socialist League which had been classified by the attorney
general as subversive and communistic. The applicant had a State De-
partment hearing at which he had tried to explain that the League was
not allied with communism and that he had been trying to obtain a hear-
ing before the attorney general for nearly six years. No complaint was
made that a fair hearing was not granted by the State Department. Fun-
damentally, there was involved a question of whether the grounds for
refusal were legally sufficient. The court held that the right to travel
was a natural right included within the terms of the fifth amendment. It
recognized that possession of a passport is an essential requisite for de-
parture from the United States and that, therefore, its issuance could not
be denied arbitrarily. The court concluded that it was an abuse of dis-
cretion for the Secretary of State to deny a person a passport solely be-
cause he was a member of an organization appearing on the attorney gen-
eral's list, when that person had attempted for six years to obtain a hear-
ing. A concurring opinion emphasized that fact that the attorney gen-
eral's list was prepared to screen government employees, not passport ap-
plicants.
The Shachtman case, along with the Bauer case, dearly indicates that
the right to secure a passport is guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Also,
in the Shachtman case, the court, touching on the substantive issue, ex-
cluded the use of the attorney general's list of subversive organizations as
a basis for denying passports.
The first case which effectively challenged the validity of the passport
regulations3 4 was Boudin v. Dulles.3 5 The applicant refused to sign an
affadavit asserting that he had never been a communist and was subse-
quently denied a passport. He had previously sworn that he was not at
that time a communist. He appealed to the Board of Passport Appeals
which affirmed the denial The district court did not hold the Passport
Regulations unconstitutional, but sent the case back to the Passport Board
because the petitioner had not had a fair hearing,36 as the finding was
not substantiated by evidence in the record. The State Department had
-225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); 44 GEO. L.J. 141 (1955).
-22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-.170 (Supp. 1956).
'136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Leon-
ard Boudin is the author of an article attacking the validity of the Passport Regu-
lations. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 CoLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956).
"136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955).
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claimed that it need not reveal security information. The district court
stated:
The right to a quasi-judicial hearing must mean more than the right
to permit an applicant to testify and present evidence. It must include the
right to know that the decision will be reached upon evidence of which
he is aware and can refute directly.7
Both parties appealed and the circuit court found that the evidence did
not bring the petitioner within any of the three classes which the De-
partment had established under the Passport Regulations.38 The court
then stated that a passport may not be denied unless an applicant comes
within one of these categories. In addition, in dealing with the difficult
problem of confronting an applicant with security information, the court
concluded that if Boudin were refused a passport after further considera-
tion the State Department must state in the record whether its findings
are based upon openly produced evidence, or on secret evidence. If the
latter, it should be explained in so far as possible, why such information
may not be disclosed.
The Boudin case furnished answers to several perplexing problems.
The opinion tacitly indicated that the Board of Passport Regulations was
established under proper authority. Although the record shows no dis-
cussion of the petitioner's contention that the Passport Regulations are
unlawful, the circuit court remanded the case for a hearing consistent with
the regulations, which would indicate judicial approval of the regulations.
Viewed from another angle the Boudin case also implicitly shows that the
Secretary of State has power, within certain discretionary limits, to pre-
vent persons suspected of subversive activity from leaving this country.
Recently, further light was shed on the meaning of the Boudin case.
Another frustrated passport applicant challenged the validity of the Pass-
port Regulations and further asserted that the denial of a passport vio-
lated due process 39 The Secretary of State, pursuant to requirements set
down in the Boudin case, submitted the record to the court showing the
reasons for the refused passport. The reasons were based on information
that the plaintiff was at one time chairman of a communist propaganda
and espionage committee, that he collaborated with Julius Rosenberg and
other alleged communists, and that he was suspected of being an espion-
age agent. The record also showed that the above information was based
on the findings made at the hearing plus confidential information which,
the Department explained, could not be disclosed without prejudice to
'
t Id. at 222.
'22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (Supp. 1956).
Dayton v. Dulles, 146 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1956).
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the conduct of foreign relations. It was concluded that the Secretary of
State had complied with the necessary due process requirements.
The district court also reaffirmed the validity of the Passport Regu-
lations. It was pointed out that the Secretary of State was given this au-
thority by legislation and presidential delegation of power.40 Thus this
court dearly decided that the Board of Passport regulations is lawfully
created under congressional act and by executive authority.
CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, during a period of strained international relations the
courts have been dealing with the problem of lawful restraint of free
movement. Although the Supreme Court has not reviewed the subject
the following observations might be made on the basis of the district
court and appellate court decisions:
1. The right to travel abroad is considered a fundamental right em-
braced by the fifth amendment.
2. Within the scope of procedural due process of law, a person who
is denied the right of travel is entitled to an administrative hearing, and
upon appeal to a court, may require an explanation as to why he is not
confronted with the evidence compiled against him.
3. Within the scope of substantive due process of law, persons who
are suspected of communistic affiliations may constitutionally be pre-
vented from departing from the United States in the interest of national
preservation, although there is no actual warfare.
It would be foolish to assume that our national security is not en-
dangered during the present "cold war." However, it seems dear that
there should be a genuine threat or danger to our form of society before
an inalienable right should be abridged as a matter of reasonable con-
troL4'1 A person who is a known communist suspected of engaging in
subversive activity might constitute such a threat.
One of the chief problems in this area seems to be the State Depart-
ment's attitude. The Department created the Board of Passport Appeals
in 1952. Yet the Department never made use of the Board until it was
forced to do so in 1955. Passport applications are often stalled for long
periods and then finally issued in order to avoid a judicial decision. With
this attitude there is danger of abuse of discretion, especially when the
curtain of "confidential information" is used to shield the Department's
"The court cites 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C 211 (a) (1952) and 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.1 (Supp. 1956).
'It has been suggested that the "clear and present danger" test be applied to the
present situation. Wyzanski, Freedom to Travel, Atlantic Monthly, October,
1952, p. 66.
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